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CHRONICLES OF THE CONTINUED
EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION OF
25 JANUARY 2011

*The Third Republic's First
Steps: From MB Repression to
Consolidation of the Military's
Power*



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Summary

The January 25, 2011 Revolution set Egypt on a path to democracy. Eighteen days later, then President Mubarak resigned and the SCAF became the custodians of the path to democracy. On June 30, 2012, Morsi was elected President even though with slightly over 25% of the popular vote. Five months later, he declared his decisions beyond judicial review and that his authority as unchallengeable. In December 2012, he rammed a pro-Islamist constitution through a popular referendum that was passed with less than 30% of the popular vote. The path to democracy was taking a turn toward theocratic autocracy. There was no way for popular democracy to change that course of events. Whether that could have been changed as time went on was doubtful and is now a matter of conjecture. On June 30, 2013 the people responded in the only way possible, with their feet in the street. There was no constitutional way to recall, impeach, or remove Morsi. 13 million people took to the streets calling for Morsi's ouster and 22 million signed a petition to that effect. Between July 2 and 3, the army intervened in support of popular demand that Morsi be deposed and held in custody then a new temporary president was sworn in. The majority of the Egyptian people supported what the military did. The MB, relying on formal legality, held that this was a military coup without legitimacy. It was, however, a coup that had popular support and therefore legitimacy. The MB started a wave of civil resistance. Protests and demonstrations turned into violence when the demonstrators attacked the military or the police.

These protests and demonstrations had a crippling effect on the life of Egyptians and prevented the country to move forward. While this increased sympathy for the MB as well as support outside Egypt, it galvanized more Egyptians to support the military and security forces adding to the already significant level of polarization and radicalization that existed. The MB's increased their fervor for martyrdom as more of their protestors confronted security forces. They even established a martyr brigade whose members now wear T-shirts with a sign "martyr." They are preparing for a major showdown when security forces will seek to remove those who have peacefully occupied the al-Rab'a Adawiyya Square, as has already been preannounced. This is likely to be a big battle for martyrdom. The MB hope that this will attract them more sympathy and support abroad and at home. The former is very likely, while the latter likely to be the opposite.

In the meantime, the MB will seek the support of external groups and al-Qaeda affiliated groups will use the pretext to attack the US and US citizens and interests wherever they can. This, in response to Secretary Kerry's statement of August 2 in Islamabad that the military have restored Egypt to the path of democracy.

The month of August will be hot in every sense of the word, as violence will escalate in Egypt and maybe elsewhere. But all of this will not help Egypt progress nor address its dire economic and social problems. Whether it will lead to a stronger role of the military and thus reduce the chances of progress toward democracy or not will depend on unfolding circumstances. The military, however do not wish to seize political power and General al-Sisi does not seek to be a dictator. They do wish to see Egypt on a path of stability and democracy, in a way that fits Egyptian culture and needs. Let there be no doubt about it, since July 2 there has been a crackdown on the MB. In addition to Morsi, most of its senior leaders have been imprisoned, their media outlets have been shutdown, and an undisclosed number of persons in the rank and file with estimates ranging from 2,000 – 3,000. Criminal trials are being prepared for Morsi and the leadership and there is a definite feeling that things are returning to the repression days of Nasser.



EGYPT'S LATEST REVOLUTION CONTENTS



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For all practical purposes, 4 July is Egypt's beginning of the Third Republic. The second, short-lived Republic was between 18 February 2011 and 4 July 2013. The First Republic was from 18 June 1953 to 18 February 2011.

The birth of the Third Republic coincided with the American Declaration of Independence on 4 July 1776. It also shared with the American experience the fact that the Declaration of Independence was completed and approved on 2 July as was the fate of the Second Republic when the military intervened on 3 July. The American Declaration was however dated 4 July because that was when the New York Delegation was able to go to Philadelphia to sign it. In Egypt, after the Military's intervention on 3 July, the appointment of an acting President was announced in the evening on 3 July and became a reality on 4 July.

Hopefully this historical coincidence will augur well for Egypt's future.

M. Cherif Bassiouni
2 August 2013
Chicago

Cover Photo

Graffiti in Cairo's Tahrir Square shows a caricature of feuding General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and ousted president Mohamed Morsi. A third blank face representing Egypt's unknown future appears beside them | © Ed Giles / Getty Images

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I. Introduction and Summary of Contents

1. The violent confrontations between the security forces and the Muslim Brotherhood (“MB”) that occurred on 26 July 2013 have become the focal point of international attention (*see* Sec. III “Repressive Reactions”). These events have come after a string of similar ones that occurred since 2 July, the last day Mohamed Morsi was in office. They have resulted so far in an estimated 250 deaths and 2,800 injuries.¹ There are well-established patterns to these confrontations, and it seems that the strategy of the MB is to increase international attention and secure worldwide sympathy and support. But this strategy has not been successful among Egyptians, most of whom are now convinced that this is a deliberate MB strategy that has to be stopped by whatever means necessary. Even though the United States, the European Union, and many Western European countries have called upon the military to do whatever possible to prevent violent incidents, this is not likely to occur before a political solution is reached. The polarisation that exists between the MB and their supporters, and the rest of Egyptian society is not likely to abate by itself and no internal political mechanism is likely to work given the present circumstances. That is why transitional justice efforts in Egypt are not likely to succeed, notwithstanding the appointment of a Minister of State dedicated to this pursuit. The only two options are: (1) to establish a United Nations Commission of Inquiry as was done in 30 other instances since 2005, most notably in Libya²; or (2) for (Temporary) President Adly Mansour to issue a Presidential Decree appointing a national commission of inquiry as was the case in Bahrain in 2011 when the King established the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), whose presence had the effect of stopping violent confrontations.³ Its report served as a basis for national reconciliation efforts (*see* Sec. VI “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation”).

2. Egyptian society has become deeply divided and polarised. No one can really assess how profound the social rifts are or what effect they may have in the future. They are surely a dangerous sign for a society that needs to be united in order to face and hopefully to overcome a multitude of contemporary challenges. If this polarisation continues, social divisions will deepen and political stability will be threatened, thereby preventing the decisive leadership and broad-based support needed to address these issues. In particular, it is clear that the country’s economic crisis will worsen in the coming months, an issue that cannot be addressed or resolved in the midst of political and social tumult (*see* Sec. IV “Conspiracy Theories”). The deepening effects of the economic crisis are deeply felt by most Egyptians, which explains why they continue to be supportive of the military and security forces, notwithstanding the casualties among the MB.

3. Another confusing factor is the cacophonous discourse of different political protagonists and observers, and the many conspiracies that they spew.⁴ As discussed below in Section IV “Conspiracy Theories”, many Egyptians are prone to believing in conspiracy theories, irrespective of source or reliability.

After the appointment of
(Temporary) Vice President
Mohammed al-Baradei | from INSS



One need merely sit at a sidewalk café or join any discussion to hear the wide variety of diverse conspiracies – all of which are presented in emotional terms and frequently based on alleged “inside information” or a connection to someone who has access to such information. Unfortunately, these conspiracy theories negatively impact everyone’s perception of the situation and their understanding of the ongoing situation; more troublingly, they directly impact future events.

4. It is difficult to verify the accuracy of the facts that led to the establishment of the Third Republic in early July up through 30 July. This may be due to the polarisation mentioned in Paragraph 2, as each political protagonist group offers a different narrative based on sometimes radically different interpretations of the same facts, and sometimes based on different facts altogether (*see* Sec. V “Accuracy of Information”).⁵ An international or national fact-finding commission should be established, as mentioned in Paragraph 1 (*see* Sec. VI “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation”).⁶

5. If there is to be any reconciliation in Egypt, and national harmonisation and coming together, it is indispensable that an accurate record be established of the participants to any particular act, what occurred and why, particularly those that resulted in the death and injury of individuals. These are essential truths that are foundational for any process of national reconciliation.

6. The discordant and fractured nature of Egypt today, and the factors stated above, will have significant consequences on Egypt’s continued stability and sustainability. Suffice it to say, as has been explained in several previous **Updates**, the continuing exponential increase in population and the fall in agricultural output and industrial productivity will have dire consequences that will take decades to reverse. The declining economic situation that is evident today will have a continuing impact on the country’s overall human development, which has already been at risk for at least the past decade and more so since the revolution began on 25 January 2011.⁷

II. Assessing Current Events

7. The Third Republic is here to stay, in one form or another. The military will have a strong role in it for the foreseeable future. This may take the form of the military formally retreating from their current public role, but maintaining control over society by pulling the strings from behind the scenes and thereby maintaining their own “state within a state,” which includes an already significant part of the national economy (namely military industries and other interests in different economic sectors discussed in Update 19). Alternatively, the military might take over the executive branch and rule the country directly, as Gamal Abdel-Nasser did in 1954. Whichever alternative it chooses, the military is likely to pursue the first option and opt not to be visibly involved in the political arena, if of course they can find pliant civilian figureheads.

8. No matter what the future government of Egypt will look like, its priority will necessarily entail stabilizing the country’s government, economy, political parties, civil society, and general public. Competency will, and indeed must, be a prime prerequisite for those appointed to cabinet and sub-cabinet positions. These new leaders must similarly possess integrity and clearly stand above the fray and the furore of contemporary Egyptian politics.



9. The corruption of the Mubarak era may subside in the foreseeable future. Within the expected future dispensation, it is unlikely that the Islamists will have more than a minimal role to play in the political life of the nation. If they accept the new political order, they will be offered a place at the table and be able to participate in legislative elections and have their presence felt. They will not be allowed to control the organs of power, whether it be the executive, the legislature, or the judiciary. So far, the MB have not come to this realisation and are therefore still engaged in public demonstrations and protests in the hopes of reclaiming the levers of power; invariably some of these actions turn violent.

10. The ongoing demonstrations and protests by the MB have proven to be fertile ground for confrontations between Islamists and MB on the one side and the military on the other, irrespective of whether they have been initiated by one side or the other, or both.

11. As stated above, even though the MB's strategy the last month has won its cause international sympathy and support, the reaction among the majority of Egyptians has been exactly the opposite and entrenched their support for the military. They see the MB's strategy of confrontation as a challenge to the popular will of the majority of Egyptians (*see* Sec. VII "Electoral Demography"). What support the MB are gaining abroad and among their supporters they are losing among their fellow countrymen. It is clear that these confrontations have discredited the MB at home, and the military aboard.

12. The effect of these confrontations and their fallout has left everyday Egyptians feeling drained, and with an overwhelming desire for stability, sustainability, and economic growth. But for now, the overriding desire is for stability and an end to these problems. As history teaches, instability and economic decline usually leads to military dictatorship. Thus in a perverse sense the MB's efforts are not only unlikely to lead the country toward democracy, but towards its polar opposite.

13. At the risk of repeating myself, the Third Republic is here to stay and the MB will not be able to change the present course of events irrespective of what they do – peacefully or otherwise – or how much favourable public sentiment or sympathy they gain at home or aboard. The dye is cast, and the only thing the MB can hope for is a negotiated place at the political table and their reintegration into the political, social, and economic fabric and processes of the nation. But for that to happen the MB the need to change their strategy of perpetual confrontation. The sooner the MB leadership comes to this realisation,



Two female supporters of deposed president Morsi sit in front of barbed wire fencing that blocks the access to the headquarters of the Republican Guard in Cairo | © AFP / Getty Images



as bitter as that pill may be to swallow, the sooner Egypt will be normalised and the MB will be able to play a constructive role in the nation's future. Unfortunately, recent events have demonstrated conclusively that the MB's reasoned strategy is not emerging, and that instead they are pursuing a more confrontational path leading to an ever-increasing number of casualties, which only serves to make the normalisation of the situation more difficult and the possibility of reconciliation more remote.

14. At the same time, Islamists have come to fear the government and military's conduct towards them. A dramatic turn of events occurred on 24 July when General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, speaking on national television in front of graduates of the Military Academy, called for a public mandate for the military and police to protect the country from violence and "potential terrorism." His speech, coupled with recent statements from (Temporary) President Adly Mansour, have stoked Islamists' fears that a full-scale crackdown against them is in the making.⁸ It is clear that these statements by al-Sisi and Mansour have further polarised the country.

15. As indicated in Paragraph 39 of Update 20, the Cabinet was formed on 16 and 17 July with Amin el-Mahdi as Minister of Transitional Justice and Reconciliation. As I noted then, this appointment, which was initially supposed to encompass the Ministry of Justice, was incongruous since the ordinary administration of justice has nothing to do with whatever is understood as "Transitional Justice and Reconciliation." As I urged then, the two functions – transitional justice and reconciliation on the one hand and the administration of justice on the other – should be separated. Thankfully they were, although not at my urging, as the Egyptian judiciary made clear its position that it would not accept the fusion of the Ministry of Justice with the new functions of "Transitional Justice and Reconciliation." Moreover, they rejected Amin el-Mahdi as Minister of Justice because he was not a member of the Judiciary per se, even though he was a member of the administrative judiciary and had held the highest position in that structure, namely President of Majlis al-Dawla (Council of State). The day after his appointment, on 22 July, it was announced that the new Minister of Justice would be Adel Abdel Hamid, who had been the previous MoJ in the Morsi regime.⁹

16. Because of the strong polarisation that exists in the Egypt, as discussed in Section I "Introduction," it is unlikely that "Transitional Justice" will take place in Egypt in any of its modalities.¹⁰ (Temporary) Vice President Mohammed al-Baradei undertook an initiative by asking Anwar Essmat al-Sadat (the nephew of the late President and head of the Reform and Development Party) to convene a group of persons representing different political factions and start a dialogue between them. But the initiative turned out to be a non-starter. The MB and their supporters were not willing to engage in such a dialogue even though the MB floated an unofficial proposal based on three conditions for such a dialogue, namely: (1) the return of Morsi to the Presidency so that he can formally resign; (2) the convening of legislative and presidential elections within 6 months; and (3) the recognising of the 2012 constitution as approved in the national referendum of 23 December 2012. The military floated an unofficial response that the first of these conditions was unacceptable, but that they were willing to negotiate the other two. Implicit in the military's response was an assurance to the MB that they would be able to resume their political and religious activities in the country, and participate in the legislative and elective processes, including by fielding candidates. All of this occurred before 20 July, when a series of MB demonstrations and protests turned violent. The confrontations have hardened not only the position of the military but also that of the majority of Egyptians who are tired of the ongoing situation. As of this writing, it is my conclusion that



the majority of Egyptians no longer favour “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation.” Instead, they have turned against the MB and support not only their repression but also their complete elimination from the political process.

17. As a result of the preceding and throughout this Update, the possible solutions as stated in Paragraph 10 have evaporated. All that remains at this point is the establishment of a United Nations Commission of Inquiry or the appointment of a national commission of inquiry, as was the case in Bahrain in 2011.¹¹

III. Repressive Reactions

18. A number of incidents occurred since the military intervention of 4 July. They include the killing and injuring of protestors, mostly MB and Islamists. The most notable of these are the incidents at: the Republican Guard’s Club, where 54 people were estimated to have been killed and 1,400 injured; in Ramses Square, where 10 people were reported dead, close to 1,000 injured, and 650 detained; in the city of al-Mansoura, where 3 women were killed and an unidentified number injured; and, in Alexandria, where 12 people were killed.



Left: On 29 July 2013 a picture of Egypt’s ousted president, Mohamed Morsi, sits on on a barricade in Nasr City, Cairo, the site of a sit-in by Islamists angry about the change in leadership | © Manu Brabo / Associated Press



Right: A supporter of ousted president Morsi shows spent ammunition fired, say witnesses, by security forces | © Amr Abdallah Dalsh / Reuters

Bottom: Egyptian soldiers put on gas masks near the Republican Guard headquarters | © Amr Abdallah Dalsh / Reuters



19. The journalist Patrick Kingsley of the Guardian reported on the events on 8 July near the Republican Guard Officers Club (where the crown believed former President Morsi to be held).¹² According to his analysis and interviews with those in the neighbourhood, the military began an unprovoked attack at around 3:30 AM, at the end of morning prayers, when they fired teargas into the crowd. As the protestors slowly withdrew and returned to their main centre of protest, at the al-Rab'ā 'Adawiyya Mosque, they began responding to the military, using various means including rocks, automatic weapons, and even furniture looted from neighbourhood apartments.¹³ It was at this moment that the military used deadly force and opened fire.

20. General al-Sisi, during a speech to the military graduates of the military academy on 24 July warned that the country was entering a dark tunnel and called upon Egyptians to take to the streets and grant the military a “popular mandate” to stamp out what he called violence and potential “terrorism.” The policy was not much different from the policy unveiled by the George W. Bush administration after the 11 September attacks on the United States, namely the declaration of war using all means and resources to combat “terrorism.”

21. To a large extent, the two approaches consider valid all means to repress threats or attacks. In Egypt, this means that Islamist reactions, and particularly those of the MB, will be met with whatever force is needed to suppress it. But the al-Sisi speech could also have served as a dramatic way of deterring any possible violent actions by the Islamists and the MB. It is reminiscent of an incident in Chicago in 1968 when riots occurred on the Southwest side of the city. Then-Mayor Richard Daley issued an order on TV to the Chicago police to “shoot to maim looters, and shoot to kill arsonists.” The statement was shocking to say the least, but it also had the effect of creating an immediate deterrence to the rioters, and consequently the de-escalation of violence by the demonstrators.¹⁴ However, Islamists and the MB, as well as many supporters of democracy throughout the world, have pointed to al-Sisi’s statement as a precursor for a dangerous turn for Egypt, one that would be similar to what happened in 1954 when Lieutenant Colonel Nasser removed Major General Mohammed Nagib as President and took his place, ushering in an era of repression and military dictatorship.

22. On 26 July, in response to General al-Sisi’s call of 24 July, millions of pro- and anti-Morsi demonstrators took to the streets.

Egyptian supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood run for cover near the elite Republican Guards club | © Mahmoud Khaled / AFP / Getty Images



Although the protests were largely peaceful throughout most of the day, in the late afternoon the Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim made a statement declaring that the pro-Morsi protests in Nasr City and Giza would soon be broken up by force, without giving a specific timeline. Later that same night, the police began a full-scale attack on pro-Morsi protestors who had expanded their protest north and blocked the Autostrad highway next to the review stand where former president Anwar Sadat had been assassinated on 6 October 1981. An estimated 50 pro-Morsi protestors were killed, with hundreds more injured in what appears to be yet another unprovoked attack by security forces. The facts, however, remain unclear. What is known indicates that this incident, like many others, began when demonstrators threw rocks and stones dug out from streets and sidewalks at the police, who responded at first by firing teargas and shotguns. The demonstrators, however, threw the teargas canisters back at the police, and in some cases gunshots were fired from among the demonstrators. It was usually at that point that the police used deadly force. It is clear from the pattern of events as they are unfolding that the MB expect the police and the military to use excessive force and they invite it by provoking it as a way of enhancing their martyrdom status and of embarrassing the new regime.

23. There is a strong belief that Hisham Refaat, the new Prosecutor General, supported by the new Minister of Justice Adel Abdel-Hamid, is planning new investigations and the bringing of charges against Islamists, including former President Morsi and many of his associates, as well as senior members of the MB. In addition, investigations are reportedly going to be opened into the sources of the MB's funding and other groups, which would include funding from Qatar as well as organisations and individuals from the Gulf States. These investigations may be a way of dismantling the MB and other groups' political structures and thus damage, if not cripple, their ability to conduct an effective political campaign for the forthcoming legislative elections and for the subsequent presidential elections. It is also quite possible that in the course of these investigations older cases kept dormant against US organisations including the United States' funding of Egyptian organisations, may be brought to the forefront as part of this big package of new charges.¹⁵

24. Foreign refugees in Egypt, particularly those from Syria, have also been targeted in these acts of repression. Egypt is currently in the process of registering some 90,000-asylum seekers from Syria, but it seems that in the Third Republic there is hostility towards Syrian refugees by everyday Egyptians, as they believe that these refugees are Morsi supporters. Human Rights Watch reports that some 72 men and 9 boys have been arrested and incarcerated, and that there is much uneasiness amongst the refugee community that they may be deported.¹⁶ Egypt's record for treating refugees, including those from the Sudan and other parts of Africa, has in recent times violated International Human Rights norms, particularly the 1967 Refugee Convention to which Egypt is a state party.

IV. The Conspiracy Theories¹⁷

25. In pointing out the existence of all sorts of conspiracy theories, as discussed below in Paragraph 18, this writer does not in any way to claim that the countries and individuals mentioned are not opposed to the MB's ruling of Egypt. But this does not imply that they conspired to undermine the MB; to do so is a long shot at best. Similarly, nobody can deny that the United States and probably many other governments in the world were displeased to see the MB's win at the 2011 legislative and 2012 presidential elections and the fact that they may have wanted to see the Morsi Presidency come to an end before 2016,



when his constitutional term would have been completed, does not imply a conspiracy to end it sooner.



Egyptian protesters hold a sign: “Wake up America, Obama backs up a fascist regime in Egypt” | from presstv.ir

26. It will take a long time before the dust settles on these conspiracy theories and the MB realise that notwithstanding their electoral results, their support amounted to no more than slightly above 25% of the Egyptian population (*see* Sec. VII “Electoral Demography”). There is no doubt that from a formal democratic and legal perspective, President Morsi and the MB were toppled by a military coup. But, there can be no denial that a large number of Egyptians voted with their feet in the streets and by a petition against Morsi and the MB. Had there been a constitutional recall mechanism or even an impeachment process that could have been triggered legally, the case for the popular revolutionary transformation would have been difficult to make. In the absence of any recall or impeachment mechanism, there was no democratic way to remove the elected President or change the government. There is also no question that this could not have been accomplished without military support and intervention. If it is a question of semantics, then one can argue that this was not a “coup” as that term has come to signify military takeovers in other countries. In Egypt there was a military coup in the sense that the military supported the popular will and executed it. Without the military’s execution of the popular will, the change of regime would not have taken place. These arguments are discussed in Update 20.

27. Following are some examples of the prevailing conspiracy theories:



- ✧ The first conspiracy is that the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) allegedly participated in the conspiracy fomented by the pro-Mubarak remnants in the government, the so-called *Fulool*. That explains why the SCC invalidated new laws and dissolved both the Majlis al-Shaab and Majlis al-Shura, including potentially obstructing the referendum on the new Constitution of 2012 (which was stopped by the MB who rallied demonstrators to block the judges' access to the Court, thus preventing the issuance of their decision declaring unconstitutional the work product of the committee whose draft constitution was to be submitted to a public referendum on 2 December).
- ✧ The second conspiracy was that the uprising was spawned by the United States,¹⁸ which at one time appeared to support the MB, but behind the scenes worked to undermine it by encouraging the military, the *Fulool*, and various secular democratic groups to rise up against the MB. In time, the US conspirators joined forces with Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates conspirators led by Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi Ambassador to the United States who is presently the head of the Saudi intelligence service.
- ✧ The third conspiracy is that a grand coalition of the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the military, the *Fulool*, and elements of Egypt's secular opposition worked together over the course of the last year to intentionally disrupt the working of the Egyptian government and eventually topple the Morsi government.

Each one of the above theories has sub-theories and different players depending upon those who are spinning those yarns. Perhaps the most interesting of these has to do with the differences between General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and then-President Morsi. As the conspiracy goes al-Sisi encouraged the Tamarrod movement (which organised the 30 June demonstration), presumably with funding from billionaire businessman and MB critic Naguib Sawiris. Sawiris is reported to have given millions to this group as well as the former National Democratic Party (NDP) of Mubarak and who, through his private media outlets and others, could influence, vilify, and demonise Morsi and his group. El-Baradei is also part of the alleged plot, and it is claimed that he maintained contacts with President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry in order to get himself appointed as President or Prime Minister. Even US pollster James Zogby has been called a facilitator of the conspiracy because he is alleged to have conducted a poll of 5,000 Egyptians in a way that helped create a current in world public opinion negative to the MB. US Ambassador Anne Patterson is also roped into some of these conspiracies.

- ✧ A fourth conspiracy theory is that the water, electricity, and gasoline shortages experienced by regular Egyptians in the past months have been the result of former regime elements still present in the government who actively used their power to cut-off basic services, fuelling public anger and encouraging the masses to protest and topple the Morsi government. They point to the fact that many of these shortages have now subsided or decreased significantly since the fall of the Morsi government, and this change is offered as proof of their claims. However, there is no direct evidence to support these claims, and it seems that there are clearer alternative explanations that can provide answers.

The gasoline shortage experienced in the weeks leading up to 30 June was in the process of being solved before the protests began. Violators who had been syphoning gasoline into the black market were arrested and local supply chains improved, thereby driving down the cost of fuel. There were four overall points that had the greatest impact: (a) the protests curtailed traffic and thus cut down demand; (b) the onset of Ramadan reduced vehicular traffic and thus reduced demand; (c) the military opened its strategic reserves for public use and thus increased the available supply; and (d) the military halted



the export of gasoline to Gaza, which the Morsi regime had supported and thus increased the supply. These factors combined have ended the shortage.

The water shortage was minimised by an order from the new Minister of Irrigation, who has allowed more water to be taken from Lake Nasser. The previous Minister avoided this move because he felt that this would ultimately have a negative effect on the electricity production of the Aswan High Dam.

The electricity crisis is far from over, and very little has changed. According to the Ministry of Electricity and Energy's website, the country has an approximate full load of around 27,000 Megawatts, with daily peak loads currently reaching around 24,000-28,000 Megawatts, depending on the weather. This full production load has recently increased as preparations for the summer had been completed. The problem of distribution was due to worn out and poorly maintained electrical equipment and lines, as well as unauthorised draws on existing lines (such as illegal construction that accidentally cut lines due to illegal street alterations). In addition, there are millions of homes in Egypt that are in unplanned areas, where the electrical main lines are nowhere near capable of handling the demand, resulting in surges and cuts. This is due to a high number of rural migrants settling in shanty-towns in the urban areas. Cairo alone is estimated to have two million new migrants settling as squatters in unauthorised areas of the now sprawling city of an estimated 16 to 18 million persons.¹⁹ Ultimately, electricity is a long-term problem faced by the Egyptian government that will come as part of comprehensive solutions for the future

V. Accuracy of Information

28. The polarisation mentioned above is the main reason for the discrepancy in sources of information about the conflicts arising over the last month. In addition, Western media outlets in Egypt face major problems in terms of accuracy, and are often being misled by partisan sources or by sources that cannot be independently corroborated. Many foreign reporters do not speak Arabic and only have a limited understanding of Egypt and its historical, cultural, and social dynamics. They tend to live isolated in wealthy neighbourhoods around Cairo, dealing mainly with foreigners and English-speaking Egyptians. When reporting from the scene, such as the pro-Morsi camp in Nasr City, they are often given information by one-sided sources. They also get their sources from Egyptian journalists and individuals who may have similarly limited access to sources or present biased views. This has resulted in unreliable accounts of events, good faith efforts and good intentions notwithstanding.

29. Local media sources also are heavily biased. As most of the pro-MB television channels have been shut down as a result of the 30 July military intervention, most of the country can only receive pro-regime satellite channels such as ONTV and CBC, which results in a slanted presentation of the events. Live pictures from pro-Morsi camps are rarely made available on these stations, and statements provided by the military and police are often taken as undeniably factual despite lacking independent confirmation. The pro-Morsi media is currently dominated by independent, Islamist youth-led news services that operate through the internet such as Rassd and al-Yaqin, which in contrast to the liberal satellite channels present an entirely pro-Morsi picture, using words such as "massacre," "slaughter," and "murder" along with other strong terms in order to increase public sentiment for the protestors. Most news is circulated by social media activists and plagued by all of the attendant problems of accuracy, bias, limited perspective, etc.



VI. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

30. As stated in Paragraph 1 above, there is a new Minister of State for Transitional Justice and Reconciliation; however, no Ministry exists yet. It is reported that the new Minister will have offices in the Shura Council building, but a mandate for ministry has yet to be drafted.

31. The term transitional justice is alien to the Arabic language, because the word “transitional” modifies the word justice and that is simply inappropriate. The concept is not understood as well as it is in the West, particularly in the United States. Reconciliation is, however, something well-ingrained in Arab and Muslim tradition. The present speculations are that a national commission is to be established, whose mandate would be to bring around the table representatives of different parties and political persuasions in order to reach national reconciliation by means that are to be determined by the said commission, which is culturally familiar. Nevertheless, this would be a long-term process not likely to succeed since many political factions are likely to boycott it.

32. Another speculation is that a national commission will be established which would be in the nature of a truth commission. That too raises concerns as to whether the commission would be able to look into the military’s behaviour since the events of 2011, up to and including events in July 2013. Such investigation will never be accepted by the military.

33. That will leave the commission to investigate the Mubarak regime, though that too will be opposed by the *Fulool* as well as a segment of the military. If it is going to focus on the post 25 January 2011 events, excluding the military, it will be opposed by the police forces that fear blame for their behaviour.

34. The military will, in this writer’s opinion, support the police because it wants them to restore public order. The many officers who took a leave of absence since the Morsi Presidency and who have since the July 2013 events returned to their posts are not likely to put themselves in jeopardy. What is left to investigate? The MB? For these reasons it is not likely for such a national commission to be established or if it is, to succeed. But a formula similar to that of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry²⁰ could be applied. Whether this happens will depend on whether the military will have enough confidence in a group of independent and fair commissioners to allow them to act independently, fairly, and effectively. At this point, it is hard to see how such an endeavour may be successful, though it certainly could be.

35. Any external force that gets involved in this national discussion is likely to be accused of favouring one side or the other, and that will have a counterproductive effect. This was the case when the United States heavily funded civil society organisations in Egypt, including US organisations working in the country without a permit, which resulted not only in a strong anti-US sentiment, but also in the closing of these organisations, the arrest of their staff, and the initiation of prosecutions for violating the law.²¹ The alternative is a UN Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council,²² provided that its members are from the Arab World, speak Arabic, know Egypt and its culture, are of a high level of integrity, fairness, and competence in regards to the matters in need of investigation. In addition, this initiative will require staff investigators from Egypt and extensive resources. Whether these particular needs can be satisfied by the UN bureaucracy will prove to be a challenge.



VII. Electoral Demography

36. As the next few months unfold, a new round of popular elections will find Egyptians voting on an amended constitution, for a new parliament and president. These elections will reveal the country's division or its unity.

37. In all four of the previous elections there was a low voter turnout, usually around 50%, as can be seen from the chart below. This is due in part to the fact that many Egyptians in rural areas felt disconnected from the politics and governance that is carried out in Cairo and a belief that they really do not count as citizens. At the other end of the spectrum, the middle and upper-middle classes do not involve themselves in elections for fear of being attacked or simply because they do not care to be involved in the voting process that puts them in contact with the poorer and maybe less educated masses. There was a haughty social reaction that they may have regretted after the election. It remains to be seen if they will change their behaviour.

38. There was also a clear division between voters in urban and rural areas. Urban areas were much more diverse, with Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal cities having the largest non-Islamist voter turnout. The Nile Delta held strong for Islamists, however there was a strong division between types of Islamists (Brotherhood and Salafists), with only a small showing for non-Islamist candidates. However, in Upper Egypt the situation was much clearer, with the vast majority of the population voting for Islamists and only Christians voting for liberal candidates.

39. The following is a list of the elections that have occurred since the beginning of the Second Republic on 11 February 2011:

(1) Referendum on Constitutional Amendments: 19 March 2011

Participation: 41% (18.5 million)

Result: **YES 77.2% (14.1 million)**, NO 22.7% (4.1 million)

(2) Parliamentary Elections: 28 November 2011 to 11 January 2012

Participation: 54%

Result: Muslim Brotherhood 37.5% (10.1 million), al-Nour Salafist 27.8% (7.5 million), New Wafd 9.2% (2.4 million)

(3) Presidential Elections: 23-24 May and 16-17 June 2012

Participation Round 1: 46% (23.6 million), Round 2: 51% (26.4 million)

Result:

Round 1: Mohammed Morsi 24.78% (5.76 million), Ahmed Shafiq 23.66% (5.5 million)

Round 2: **Mohammed Morsi 51.73% (13.2 million)**, Ahmed Shafiq 48.27 (12.3 million)

(4) Constitutional Referendum: 15 and 22 December 2012

Participation: 32.86% (17 million)

Result: **YES 63.83% (10.7 million)**, NO 36.17% (6.0 million)



VIII. Geopolitical Considerations

40. Egypt's Third Republic is unlikely to do anything that will upset its relations with Israel or endanger the peaceful relations between the two, which is indispensable to Egypt maintaining good relations with the United States. Egypt will work much closer with Saudi Arabia and through it with the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly in the areas of economic cooperation and political support. Qatar, which was the principal funder of the MB, has a new Emir who will tow the Saudi line. It is already reported that Qatar has cut funding for the MB.

41. Due to the MB's marginalisation in Egypt and the absence of major Qatari financial backing, the group's power in the MENA region will be reduced. In Libya, it is unlikely that the MB will increase their power. In Tunisia, whatever influence the MB had is also likely to ebb. The MB's strong support for Hamas no longer exists. That will weaken Hamas' relationship with Fatah, its secular opponent centred in the West Bank. In Jordan, where the MB had a strong presence, they will probably lose some momentum. As for the MB in Syria, they are far too engulfed in a protracted civil war that is not likely to come to a quick end to be able to weigh in on what happens to the MB in the region. In contrast, extremist groups usually referred to as linked with al-Qaeda are on the rise in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Morocco.

42. A new alliance has been forged between Egypt's Third Republic, the United States, and the GCC under Saudi leadership, which from the perspective of regional policy will produce results substantially similar to those that existed under the Mubarak regime. The only danger is that the United States will make a mistake, as it is prone to do in the Arab World, by antagonising the Egyptian masses that might then influence the military to change course in connection with its strong US relations. As stated in Update 20, this could turn into a golden opportunity that Russia is waiting for, much like with the Soviet Union in 1956, where each moved in after the United States withdrew. The blunder was that of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who withdrew funding for the Aswan dam and caused Egypt to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance. Consequently, Egypt remained the Soviet Union's ally until 1972 when the late President ousted all Russian military and technical personnel from Egypt before embarking on the 1973 war with Israel. Surely the Obama administration is mindful of this historic lesson (*see* Sec. IX "The Dilemma of the United States").

43. Probably in response to the speech made by al-Sisi mentioned in Paragraph 13 and other events, US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel recently communicated to General al-Sisi that President Obama had ordered to delay the delivery of 4 F-16 fighter planes to the Egyptian Air Force. But the White House emphasised that the decision did not have implications for the \$1.5 billion in American aid to Egypt scheduled for the next fiscal year. Other military cooperation between the US and Egypt also remains in effect, including the major annual joint military exercise called "Bright Star."

44. For all practical purposes, this is the end of the "Arab Spring."²³ The only hotspot left is Syria, tragic as it is, with almost 100,000 casualties. The United States has faltered and proven unable to determine whether it can or wants to help topple the Assad regime. In a letter to Congress, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey outlined a number of options for US action, ranging from small-scale training programmes for opposition forces outside of the country to the "destruction of the country's chemical



weapons” which would likely involve the US military.²⁴ But it is more likely that the situation in Syria will play itself out over death and destruction only to ultimately result in a settlement imposed from external forces. The planned August peace conference in Geneva may clarify the situation.

45. The Arab World remains in a constant state of upheaval.²⁵ Even though things may appear under control, they are always likely to explode for the most unexpected reason and at the most unexpected time. The situation in Syria is far from resolved, Lebanon is always capable of imploding with Hezbollah controlling the trigger, Morocco is seething, Tunisia and Libya are unstable, and Bahrain remains vulnerable. All of that to say in the most diplomatic of terms that the situation in the Arab World, as well as in Egypt, is fluid, unpredictable, and potentially explosive.

IX. The Dilemma of the United States

46. The Obama administration finds itself in a dilemma as to whether it should support the military and risk facing negative reactions by the MB and Islamists throughout the Arab and Muslim World, and thus also enhance terrorism threats against the US and its citizens, or go against the military and enforce US law on foreign military and economic assistance, which prohibits support for military coups and repressive regimes that violate internationally protected human rights. So far the administration has been able to navigate the middle ground, as it has done throughout the “Arab Spring.”²⁶ Conspiracy theories discussed in Section IV already accuse the United States of being disingenuous and playing both sides against the middle, and one side against the other. Even if one discounts all of these conspiracy theories, there is no doubt that ambiguity is the worst policy in the Arab World and particularly in Egypt at this time. The type of constructive ambiguity that used to be the hallmark of the Nixon Administration, as carried out by Henry Kissinger,²⁷ is for a number of reasons no longer workable in the Arab World, and particularly in Egypt. Technology has made information and communications so much easier and faster, and has left little to the secretive recesses of diplomacy. So much is known by so many and so fast, that Machiavellian diplomacy and politics is very difficult to carry out.

47. The Obama administration has to decide whether it supports the military at the risk of alienating those who advocate democracy and human rights in the international community, being on the wrong side of US foreign assistance law, or alienating Egypt and offering an opportunity to Russia to become a substitute arms purveyor, with all the geopolitical consequences that this would comport, as discussed in Paragraph 26 above and in Paragraph 24 of Update 20. At this point, the United States is already losing support among Egyptians, even though it is alleged that Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey have reassured their counterparts in the Egyptian military that US support and cooperation remains the same, though subject to postponement of delivery of F16 planes and maybe other delivery of military equipment and parts.

48. The Obama administration has to be mindful of the fact that the majority of the Egyptian people are now clearly in opposition to the MB and in support of the military. They are not troubled by the type of repression discussed in Section III. The United States can, however, support either one of the two options mentioned in Section I and Section II, namely either the establishment by the UN Human Rights Council of a Commission of Inquiry (provided that it consists of persons of Arab background who speak



Arabic and not of international experts from different countries who do not speak the language and are not attuned to the culture), or the establishment of a national Commission similar to the BICI model as described above in Section I. This is something the United States should support now. It has to be understood, however, that the most important element of either of these formulas is the composition of the Commission. In the case of a national Commission, unless it is composed of Egyptians of a high moral character and an unquestioned sense of integrity as well as the competence to carry out fair and effective fact-finding with total independence from the government (but with the cooperation of the government), the initiative will not have popular acceptance or credibility. An international Commission would have even more difficulties with respect to the selection of its members and also because of all of the difficulties inherent in the way these commissions work under the UN system.²⁸

49. The United States should also send signals to the Egyptian people that it will continue its economic assistance and technical assistance to the country. This means that the USAID staff that has

Bottom: Morsi Supporters wearing t-shirts that read: "Project Martyrdom" | © Khalil Hamra / AP



Top: After Kerry's cordial meeting with Morsi in March 2013, and US support of his regime, Secretary Kerry announced on 1 August 2013 in Islamabad, Pakistan that he believes the military was "restoring democracy" by ousting Morsi. *See* Michael R. Gordon & Kareem Fahim, *Kerry Says Egypt's Military Was 'Restoring Democracy' in Ousting Morsi*, NEW YORK TIMES, 1 Aug. 2013 | © Jacquelyn Martin / AP



been evacuated from Cairo should return and resume their activities. This is particularly true with respect to providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice in the training of judges and prosecutors, as well as to the Ministry of Interior in the training of police officers and riot control, so as to minimise harmful consequences, and for prosecutors and police investigators to ensure that guidelines on the use of force are being adequately observed and that the rights of the accused are being safeguarded. All of these are fairly low-cost programmes. In fact, cumulatively they would not even amount to the price of one F16, but they would have a significant impact in the country and thus will be a credit to the US.²⁹

50. The Obama administration should also be mindful of important but small symbolic signals, some of which should occur in country and others within the United States. For example, so far no one in the administration has met with a group of Egyptian-American opinion-makers and organisational leaders to discuss Egypt's situation. At the recent Secretary of State's official Department of State iftar dinner, no Egyptian personality was invited.³⁰ This in itself sends a negative signal in contrast to a very positive signal if such meetings occurred and were publicised in US and Egyptian media as was the case during the Carter, Regan, and the first Bush administrations.

X. Is Morsi the Way Out?

51. The post 30 June story of Morsi is yet to be told and many facts remain unknown. At first he was reported to be hiding somewhere in the Presidential Palace, then it was reported that he issued a broadcast statement that was in the nature of an open call to resistance. That was followed by his arrest and rumours circulated that he was at the Republican Guards' Officers Club, which prompted the demonstrations in al-Rab'a 'Adawiyya. That turned out to be false. A number of other senior MB were also arrested and their whereabouts are still unknown. A large number of MB rank and file have also been arrested, which includes those arrested at demonstrations and others.

52. A recent report by two Egyptian NGOs confirms that the military authorised a visit to Morsi and some of his top aides while they are being held in an undisclosed facility. On 31 July, the New York Times reported that Lady Catherine Ashton, the European Union's top foreign policy official, actually met former President Morsi.³¹ Neither the first visitors mentioned above, nor Commissioner Ashton, were able to identify the location, but both confirmed that the facilities were not

Former President Mohammed Morsi meets with General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi at the presidential palace in Cairo | © AP



only adequate but designed for high-level guests and that the former President was treated with all dignity and honours attendant to a dignitary hosted in that villa. Apparently, staff provided for his meals and needs, and he had freedom to move inside the villa. It is uncertain whether he also had garden privileges. In short, his treatment with such dignity had to be reassuring to the rank and file of the MB, but also to other MB leaders. It definitely showed a willingness on the part of the military to preserve the dignity of the senior leadership of the MB and therefore to reassure them that if a political deal could be worked out, they could all live together happily thereafter.

53. What this may portend is the return of Morsi as the negotiator of a political settlement, although from some reports it appears that he is quite rigid in his position that he is the legitimate ruler of Egypt. But that may be because he does not know how the situation on the ground has evolved. He could be under the impression that the MB are holding their own and maybe even winning the day for the hearts and minds of the public, and that they are destined to sweep back to power. But, that may change if Morsi suddenly realises that the MB's position in the streets is becoming difficult, if not untenable. The fact that he is treated with dignity and respect, and offered the comforts that someone holding the rank of President became accustomed to, may in a strange way create an opening for a political settlement. If so, the immediate future looks much more promising than what would otherwise appear from looking at events in the streets. For the time being, the number of casualties is relatively low and there has been a lull

54. What this may portend is that Morsi could well turn out to be the negotiator of a political settlement though from some reports it appears that he is quite rigid in his position. That may be because he does not know what the situation on the ground may be. He could be under the impression that the MB are holding their own and maybe even winning the day. But, that may change if he suddenly realises that their position in the streets is becoming difficult, if not untenable. The fact that he is treated with dignity and respect, and offered the comforts that someone holding the rank of President may have become accustomed to may in a strange way be an opening for a political settlement. If so, the immediate future looks much more promising than what would otherwise appear from looking at events in the streets. For the time being, the number of casualties is relatively low and there has been a lull in the confrontations and apparently a reduction in the use of deadly force by the police and the



Protesters displayed a photograph of ousted president Mohamed Morsi, and chanted slogans during a sit-in at Cairo University on 1 August 2013 | © Narciso Contreras / New York Times



military. This is in no small part due to the pressures of the US, the European Union, and many governments both in the West and in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia.

55. Malian President Alpha Omar Konare will also be visiting Morsi on behalf of the African Union, as well as two Senators from the US, namely John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who are both members of the Armed Services Committee.

Expectation of Violence

The next two weeks are likely to see an increase in violence. The MB are going to take their last big stand at al-Rab'a Adawiyya in a way that is reminiscent of many other historic precedents. They believe in martyrdom and they believe that it will result in something positive. Until then, it is not likely that a political solution will develop. That last scene still has to be played out. In the meantime and quite likely thereafter, Islamist extremist groups usually referred to as al-Qaeda affiliates will engage in violence against the US and US citizens and US interests anywhere they can attack them. What consequences will attach to that will depend on the targets they choose and the significance of the harm they produce.

All of these are spoiler techniques which do not add anything constructive to the present or future. Instead, it is a senselessly destructive and only designed to increase the levels of polarization and radicalization between Muslims and non-Muslims in the world. Whether this will involve renewed violence between certain groups in Gaza against Israel is also likely. It will also increase violence between the Egyptian's second army in the Sinai and the Sinai Bedouins supported by infiltrators from Gaza and maybe elsewhere under Morsi, weapons from Libya were smuggled to the Sinai Bedouins and to Gaza in 2012 and also in 2011. ↪



1. In contrast, during and immediately following the events of the 25 January 2011 Revolution, there were an estimated 1,100 deaths and 6,500 injuries. This included major conflicts between Christian protestors and security forces in Maspero that resulted in 28 deaths and 212 injuries. Also during the clashes in Tahrir Square, tens of peaceful protestors were killed and hundreds injured by police snipers from the roofs of residential buildings.
2. See M. Cherif Bassiouni Ed., DRAFT SIRACUSA GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL FACT-FINDING BODIES (Intersentia, Brussels, Belgium 2013).
3. See REPORT OF THE BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (10 Dec. 2011) available at <http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf>
4. For the best description published thus far on these conspiracy theories, see [The Grand Scam: Spinning Egypt's Military Coup by Esam al-Amin](#) *CounterPunch Weekend Edition* July 19-21, 2013.
5. For example, see The Guardian's coverage of the events which are heavily influenced by MB sources: [Crisis in Egypt: 'We didn't have space in the fridges for all the bodies.'](#) *The Raw Story* July 28, 2013.
6. As Bahrain did with the BICI see Supra Note 3.
7. See [Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries](#), United Nations Development Programme (2009) available at <http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2009e.pdf>; [Human Development Report](#), United Nations Development Programme (2013) available at <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2013GlobalHDR/English/HDR2013%20Report%20English.pdf>.
8. Kareem Fahim, [Egyptian General Calls for Mass Demonstrations](#) *The New York Times*, July 24 2013.
9. The only open position left was that of Minister of Transportation and it was filled by Eng. Ibrahim al-Demeri.
10. M. Cherif Bassiouni, THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE (2 vols., Intersentia, Brussels, Belgium, 2010); Neil J. Kritz, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECON WITH FOREIGN REGIMES (U.S. Institute of Peace Press 1995); ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, Jane E. Stromseth Ed. (Transnational Pub. 2003); M. Cherif Bassiouni and Daniel Rothenberg, The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (DePaul University International Human Rights Law Institute 2007).
11. See supra notes 2 and 3.
12. [At the Second Kneel of the Prayers, the Attack Began](#), *The Guardian*, 18 July 2013.
13. *Id.*
14. At the time, I chaired a committee of inquiry of the Chicago Bar Association and found out that the Superintendent of Police had issued no such orders.
15. The case against US organizations operating in Egypt from February 2012 included 43 political activists, 19 of whom were Americans, and involved the International Center for US Reporters, Freedom House, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute.
16. See for more information "Egypt: Arrests of Syrians Raise Deportation Fears," Human Rights Watch, 25 July 2013.
17. See Note 1
18. See Chossudovsky, Michael. [Was Washington Behind Egypt's Coup d'Etat?](#) *The Rossland Telegraph*, 4 July 2013.
19. No one has been able to determine the exact number of residents and daily visitors.
20. See Infra note 3.
21. Most of these charges are untrue and the US organizations working in Egypt had been there for years without any official protest. This was a politically motivated action that is not over yet.
22. See supra nt. 2.
23. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, *The "Arab Revolution" and Transitions in the Wake of the "Arab Spring"*, 17 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. --- (2012).
24. [General Outlines Options for U.S. Intervention in Syria](#), *CBS News* 23 July 2013. These options also came with proposed price tags, with around \$500 million for training programs or \$1 billion a month for an invasion.
25. See Eugene Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, *Storm Over the Arab World: A people in revolution* (Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1972).
26. See Infra nt. 28.
27. See Kissinger, Henry. *Years of Upheaval* (New York: Little & Brown Co, 1982).
28. See Supra nt. 2, M. Cherif Bassiouni Ed., DRAFT SIRACUSA GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL FACT-FINDING BODIES (Intersentia, Brussels, Belgium 2013).
29. For example, the USAID assistance to the Moj is only \$7.5 million.
30. This includes such noteworthy personalities as Dr. Ahmmad Zwait, who is a professor at Cal Tech and a winner of the Noble Prize in Chemistry in 1999, and this writer who was a nominee for the Noble Peace Prize the same year and a well-known figure among Egyptian-Americans. But there are many others in almost every state whose professional and personal achievements would have warranted the attention of any protocol officer in the White House or the Department of State, contrary to what was the practice in the Carter, Reagan, and Bush Senior Administrations.
31. Kareem Fahim and Mayy el Sheikh, [Morsi's Visitors Leave a Mystery on Where He Is](#) *The New York Times*, July 31 2013.

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